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Abstract
U.S. state-level banking deregulation during the 1980’s mitigated the impact of the China
trade shock (CTS) on local economies (states and commuting zones) a decade later, in the
1990s. Local economies, where local bankingmarkets opened up earlier, were also effectively
financially more integrated by the 1990’s and saw smaller declines in house prices, wages, and
income following the CTS.We explain this pattern in a theoretical model that emphasizes the
stabilizing effect of financial integration on demand for housing and on housing prices: faced
with an adverse shock to their region’s terms-of-trade (i.e. theCTS), households inmore open
states can more easily access credit to smooth consumption. This stabilizes consumer de-
mand for housing, keeps the relative price of housing up, stabilizes wages in the non-tradable
sector and thus facilitates the sectoral reallocation of labor away from import-exposed man-
ufacturing towards the housing sector. This in turn stabilizes income and consumption. We
corroborate these predictions of our model in state- and commuting zone level data. Then,
using granular bank-county-level data, we show that household consumption smoothing in
response to the CTS was easier in financially open areas, because geographically diversified
banksweremore elastic in their lending response to household’s increased demand for credit.
Our findings highlight that household access to finance is important to ease adjustment after
asymmetric terms-of-trade shocks in monetary unions, in particular when the geographical
mobility of labor is limited.
Keywords: banking deregulation, China trade shock, sectoral reallocation, house prices,
consumer access to finance
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During the 1990’s and early 2000’s, growing import competition from China disrupted the U.S.
manufacturing sector. This “China Syndrome” was first documented by Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013) who show that U.S. labor market regions (commuting zones) with manufacturing indus-
tries that were particularly exposed to Chinese import competition also saw the biggest drops in
manufacturing employment and wages.
The seminal paper by Autor et al. (2013) sparked a considerable body of follow-up empirical
and theoretical work (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2016); Autor et al. (2016); Pierce and Schott (2016);
Caliendo et al. (2019)). This literature has drawn attention to the fact that net gains from inter-
national trade are very unequally distributed. While the benefits in the form of cheaper imports
are widely dispersed across U.S. households (Amiti et al. (2017)), the costs, e.g. in terms of the
displacement of workers, are geographically concentrated in the areas where industries directly
competing with Chinese imports tend to cluster.
The literature has shown that low geographical mobility of labor is one of the key reasons
why the labor market effects of trade competition are regionally so concentrated and persistent
(Faber et al. (2019); Notowidigdo (2020); Blanchard andKatz (1992)). This raises the questionwhat
alternative mechanisms there are to even out the geographically heterogeneous negative effects of
trade integration. One such mechanism is financial integration. In the absence of labor mobility,
themobility of capital should play a particularly prominent role for the adjustment to asymmetric
shocks in a monetary union (Mundell (1961)). However, so far no study has asked to what extent
geographic differences in financial integration affected the response of U.S. regional economies
to the China trade shock and the sectoral reallocation that followed it. This is is the question we
ask in this paper.
The China trade shock constituted a major deterioration of the terms of trade of many local
economies in the United States. At a theoretical level, one would expect that regions with easier
access to finance would see a swifter sectoral reallocation after a such terms-of-trade shock. This
could happen through various channels. Better access to finance may make it easier for directly
exposed manufacturing firms to survive the China trade shock in the first place, thus attenuating
the drop inmanufacturing employment andwages. Better access to financemay alsomake it easier
for displaced manufacturing workers to retrain or start businesses in other sectors. Last but not
least, easier access to finance may allow consumers to smooth consumption, which props up local
demand for non-tradable consumption, thus facilitating the reallocation from manufacturing to
non-tradable industries.
To explore these hypotheses empirically, we exploit the fact that theUnited States experienced
a period of significant deregulation of the banking industry during the 1980’s. In particular, in
the decade before the China trade shock, individual states opened their local banking markets by
allowing banks from outside the state to enter (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Morgan et al., 2004).
Since states deregulated in different years (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999), there was considerable
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variation at the state level in the number of years that had elapsed since banking liberalization until
a local economy was hit by the China trade shock in the mid-1990’s. By the time the China trade
shock started to hit in the 1990’s, banking deregulation at the state level was largely complete.
However, as we have argued in Hoffmann and Stewen (2020), deregulation left a long shadow in
the sense that differences in the de facto level of integration of state banking markets continued
to persist for more than a decade, with states that opened their markets earlier also being more
integrated de facto. We condition on these pre-determined differences in financial integration to
ask if and how state banking systems that were more integrated with the rest of the country were
able to help local economies deal with the fallout from the China trade shock.
Our results suggest that the fallout of the China trade shock on local economies was indeed
attenuated by financial integration. To interpret our empirical findings, we propose a two-sector
model with a tradable (manufacturing) and a non-tradable durable (housing) sector and in which
regions differ in their access to finance. Based on this model, we argue that the patterns in the data
support the view that access to finance primarily worked by stabilizing local consumer demand,
thus keeping demand for housing and house prices up. This, in turn facilitated the reallocation of
displaced workers from the manufacturing to the non-tradable sector.
We test this model using annual panel data for the U.S. states and commuting zones covering
the period from1991 to 2007. To do so, we expand the data set of Autor et al. (2013) to obtain state-
and commuting zone-level import exposures at the annual frequency. Our estimation results
confirm the predictions of the stylized model. Local differences in financial integration did not
directly mitigate the impact of the China trade shock on manufacturing firms and manufacturing
employment. Rather, by allowing households to smooth consumption through borrowing, better
access to bank finance led to a stabilization of demand for non-tradable goods and housing. This
kept prices in these sectors relatively high and allowed a swifter reallocation of workers from the
import-exposed manufacturing sector to the housing sector. Consistent with this pattern and the
predictions of the model, we find that—conditional on their exposure to the China trade shock—
states and commuting zones that were financially more integrated saw higher mortgage lending
growth.
Our empirical findings hold up controlling for a host of local characteristics that could have
affected pre-1991 trends at the local level, such as house price growth, employment growth, the
relative sizes of the tradable and non-tradable sectors, and the openness to trade. Controlling for
these factors is important since state-level banking deregulation is known to have affected many
of these state-level characteristics and we need to rule out the possibility that these outcomes—
rather than the long shadow that banking deregulation left on local access to credit—modulated
the response of local economies to the China trade shock.
We also control for a host of alternative channels through which local differences in finan-
cial integration could have affected the response of local economies to aggregate factors such as
monetary policy, credit availability or capital inflows. Again our results are robust.
One concern about using U.S. banking deregulation to identify local differences in access to
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finance is that it varies only at the state level. We therefore also explore an alternative identification
strategy that exploits differences in financial openness at the county-level and that allows us to put
some key elements of our theory under the microscope. Specifically, in our model, reallocation
after the China trade shock is swifter in financially open states because households have better
access to credit, which allows them to smooth consumption and, in turn, stabilizes the demand
for and the prices of non-tradable goods, notably of housing. Hence we would expect that i) the
China trade shock actually amounts to a positive credit demand shock, ii) that banks are more
elastic in their response to this shock in more financially open locations, and iii) and that house
prices remained higher in counties where ii) is the case.
We examine these three elements of themechanism using bank-county level data onmortgage
refinancing demand from theHomeMortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data base. This data allows
us to separate bank-level credit supply shocks from the local-specific demand shocks faced by
banks using the methodology recently proposed by Amiti and Weinstein (2018) and adapted to
bank-county level data in Hoffmann and Stewen (2020). Consistent with our theory, we find that
county-level import exposure is positively associated with the demand for refinancing and for
mortgage equity withdrawal faced by the banks in the county. Importantly, geographically more
diversified banks that are active in several states are more willing to satisfy this demand. Hence,
local and geographically diversified banks differ in their elasticity of credit supply, i.e. they expand
their supply of credit differentially in response to a given demand shock. This finding explains,
why—given their exposure to Chinese imports—households could generally borrowmore easily
in early-deregulated states, which have a stronger presence of geographically diversified banks.
Finally, we show that counties and commuting zones dominated by geographically diversi-
fied banks with relatively more elastic credit supply responses saw more stable housing prices in
response to the China trade shock. To this end, we build on Gabaix and Koijen (2020) and con-
struct a granular lending response—GLR—that aggregates individual banks’ responses to the
county-level, correcting for the potential confounding effects that import exposure could have
on local outcomes through other channels. In order to alleviate the concern that banks’ market
shares could themselves be endogenous, we follow Hoffmann and Stewen (2020) and construct
an exogenous measure of banks’ market shares that exploits the different deregulation histories
of the home states of banks active in a specific county. In line with the mechanism in our theory,
we find that GLR has a strong positive effect on county-level house prices.
Our paper directly relates to a growing body of literature—starting with Jayaratne and Stra-
han (1996)—that has used the quasi-experiment of state-level banking deregulation to study the
effects of credit supply shock on economic outcomes. More recently Favara and Imbs (2015) have
documented the impact of banking deregulation on mortgage credit supply and house prices.
Hoffmann and Stewen (2020) show that house prices in states that liberalized early during the
1980’s were more correlated with capital inflows into the U.S. after 1997. Bremus, Krause and
Noth (2019) examine the role of idiosyncratic banking shocks on local mortgage credit supply in
the United States. Mian, Sufi and Verner (2020) show that states that liberalized their banking
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markets earlier during the 1980’s saw more pronounced boom-bust cycles in consumer lending
during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Their results support the view that the effect of banking
deregulation on credit supply was largely transmitted through an increase in household debt. Our
analysis also relates to the recent study by Federico, Hassan and Rappoport (2020) who examine
the impact of the China trade shock on bank credit supply, using Italian bank-firm level data.
Different from all of these papers which focus on credit supply, our analysis draws atten-
tion to the role that banking deregulation played in modulating a major shock to credit demand.
Specifically, we argue that the pattern in the data is consistent with the view that the blow of the
China trade shock got softened mainly because households in more financially integrated states
could smooth consumption by increasing net borrowing. Hence, differently from earlier papers,
we do not focus on the credit supply effect of financial liberalization itself. Rather, we ask how
better access to finance for private households can stabilize consumer demand in the presence of
large external shock to a region’s terms-of-trade and – in so doing — can facilitate the sectoral
reallocation of employment.
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Our findings also shed light on the role of households’ access to finance in sharing the risks
associated with asymmetric shocks among regions of a monetary union. It is well-documented
that cross-border banking integration fosters better risk sharing (Demyanyk et al., 2007; Kalemli-
Ozcan et al., 2009). The lack of genuine cross-border banking integration in the EuropeanMone-
taryUnion (EMU) is often identified as a prime reason forwhy risk sharing amongEMUcountries
is so low (Draghi, 2018; Hoffmann, Maslov, Sørensen and Stewen, 2019). At the same time, labor
mobility in Europe is generally even lower than in the United States (House et al. (2018)), sug-
gesting that the role of household access to finance in dealing with adverse shocks to local labor
markets could be relatively even more important in Europe than in the United States.
Finally, our results also complement previous research on the long-run impact of the China
trade shock on the level and composition of employment in U.S. regional labor markets. Charles,
Hurst and Notowidigdo (2016, 2018) have argued recently that the true employment effects of
the China trade shock were masked by the concurrent rise in house prices prior to 2008. Charles
et al. (2016, 2018) argue that the rise of the housing bubble in the late 1990’s made it easier for
households to temporarily maintain consumption (mainly through job creation in construction
but possibly also through mortgage borrowing and equity withdrawal) even though their income
and employment prospects had been permanently harmed by import competition from China.
Our results here suggest that that the reallocation of workers towards construction and the in-
crease in household debt during this period could, at least in part, be a direct causal consequence
of the China trade shock rather than a coincidence.
The paper is organized as follows. We start, in section 2, with a brief history of state-level
banking deregulation in the United States. In section 3, we take a first look at the data. Section
1
In line with our findings here, Barrot et al. (2017) document that import competition contributed to the rise
of household leverage prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Different from them, we focus on regional differences in
financial integration and how they mattered for stabilizing local housing markets and for sectoral reallocation.
5
4 presents a model of how financial openness modulates the response of an economy to a terms-
of-trade shock. Section 5 presents our data. Section 6 discusses the empirical framework and
presents our empirical results at the state and commuting zone levels. Section 7 presents further
bank-county level evidence on our mechanism. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background: state-level banking deregulation in the U.S.
In our analysis we make use of the quasi-experiment of the gradual abolition of geographical re-
strictions on banking in the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s. The staggered timing
of this deregulation provides an ideal laboratory to explore empirically how these regulatory dif-
ferences in openness to a bank entry affected the real economy. While the China trade shock
only started to hit the U.S. from the mid–1990s onward (Autor et al., 2013), our argument builds
on Hoffmann and Stewen (2020) who show that banking deregulation in the 1980s left a long
shadow in the sense that states that opened their banking markets earlier during the 1980s still
were financially more integrated with the rest of the U.S. than a decade later.
As discussed by Hoffmann and Stewen (2020), many of the restrictions barring the activity
of out-of-state banks (as well as intra-state branching restrictions discussed below) dated back to
the 19th century. More recently it was the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 that gave states the authority to effectively prohibit out-of-state banks from acquiring
banks in the state. All states implemented this prohibition which only gradually got diluted from
the late 1970s onward. Beginning with Maine in 1978, state legislatures began to enact laws that
allowed out-of-state bank holding companies (BHCs) to control banks in their state. These laws
often authorized out-of-state acquisitions only on a reciprocal basis, i.e. “home” banks were only
allowed to be acquired by banks headquartered in a state that also had allowed entry of “home”
banks or by banks from a neighboring state. We will exploit this reciprocal nature of deregulation
to construct our county-level measure of financial openness later in the paper.
At the federal level, in 1982 legislators amended theBankHoldingCompanyAct to allow failed
banks to be acquired by any holding company, regardless of state laws. Furthermore, the passage
of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 forced all
states to allow entry of out-of-state banks if they had not yet done so. As the last state, Hawaii
allowed out-of-state entry in 1995.
Until the early 1990s, geographical barriers to bank entry were not only prevalent between
states but also within them, with many states upholding restrictions on intrastate branching. Our
focus in this paper is on how household-level access to finance helped stabilize local economies
after the China trade shock. Given that the fallout from the shock was highly localized, we would
expect that the removal of intrastate branching restrictions would have a similar effect on access
to credit as interstate deregulation. Many states are big enough to allow for a meaningful geo-
graphic diversification of banks evenwithin the state’s borders—provided there are no branching
restrictions. Like interstate integration, we would expect this to make banks more willing to in-
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crease supply in response to highly local credit demand shocks. Based on these considerations,
our main measure of state-level financial openess is
DI
s = 1995 − min {Year of Intrastate Branching, Year of Interstate Banking} . (1)
where s indexes the state. Hence, we count the number of years between the ‘effective‘ date of lib-
eralization of banking markets– interstate or intrastate liberalization, whichever is earlier—and
1995, the year when the IBBEA effectively removed all of these barriers. Building on Hoffmann
and Stewen (2020) we then argue–and will show empirically–that the time elapsed since the liber-
alization of a state’s banking markets mattered for households ability to borrow when faced with
the China trade shock, a decade later.
3 A first look at the data
In Figure 1 we take a first look at the data. The figure plots average changes in manufacturing
and real estate employment, wages and house prices against the state’s exposure to import com-
petition from China over the period from 1991 to 2007. Our measure of the degree of import
competition—Chinese import exposure per worker—directly follows Autor et al. (2013) and we
discuss the construction of this measure in more detail in the data section below. Based on our
discussion of the history of state-level banking deregulation in the previous section, we classify
states into two groups: early liberalizers are states that opened their banking markets for banks
from other states before 1985. Conversely, states that opened their banking markets only after
1985 are classified as late liberalizers.
While our empirical analysis below will make use of state-, commuting zone-, and county-
level data, the figure gives a preview of our main empirical results at the state level: higher expo-
sure to import competition from China generally leads to larger drops in employment and wages
in all states. The unconditional correlation between Chinese import exposure and labor market
outcomes is significantly negative — this is the original results of Autor et al. (2013). However,
importantly, depending on a state’s financial openness the relative importance of price and wage
adjustment is reversed. In the financially open states (early liberalizers), the negative link between
Chinese import exposure and the manufacturing employment is much starker than for the late
liberalizers. This seems to suggest that financial liberalization, if anything, did speed up the de-
cline in manufacturing and seems to rule out the possibility that access to finance increased the
resilience of manufacturing industries to Chinese import competition. At the same time, the link
between Chinese import exposure and the real estate employment is reversed among the early-
liberalizers, whereas it remains strongly negative among the late liberalizers. Turning to wages
and prices, we see that average growth rate ofwages and house prices is strongly negatively associ-
atedwith the Chinese import exposure among the late liberalizers, while the relationship between
import exposure and the growth rates of wages and house prices is insignificant or even positive
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for the early liberalizers. The same results also hold for the growth rates of state average income
and consumption per capita.
These findings provide the benchmark for a stylizedmodel that we present next. In themodel,
financially more open states experience a stronger adjustment in employment patterns following
the terms-of-trade shock and relatively stable wages in both sectors. This happens because house-
hold’s ability to borrow stabilizes demand for the non-tradable good—housing in themodel—and
thus keeps housing prices higher. This in turn keeps wages up in the non-tradable sector, provid-
ing a stronger incentive for the sectoral reallocation of labor from the import exposed tradable
sector to the non-tradable sector. The bottom right graph of Figure 1 shows that prices of the
probably most non-tradable good—housing—indeed remained higher in early-liberalized states
and were also less affected by Chinese import competition, which is a key prediction of the theory
that we now present.
4 Theoretical Framework
To guide our empirical analysis, in this section we present a simple model with two sectors: a
manufacturing (tradable) and a local housing (non-tradable) sector. The model builds on and
extends Monacelli (2009) and Ferrero (2015), and in particular emphasizes the role of consumers’
demand and their access to finance in facilitating the reallocation of labor between sectors. In
the model, the China trade shock amounts to a deterioration in the local economy’s terms of
trade which will decrease wages and employment in the manufacturing sector. Without access to
finance, households will not be able to smooth consumption. This leads to a drop in the household
demand for housing and thus lowers local housing prices. Since house prices drop in line with
income, there is no reallocation of labor between sector. By contrast, if households can borrow
to smooth consumption, household demand for housing is stabilized. This mitigates the negative
impact of the terms-of-trade shock on house prices, keeping them relatively high. Higher housing
prices speed up the reallocation of labor into the housing sector, which in turn stabilizes wages
and output.
4.1 Environment
Our model describes a small open local economy l (region) in a large monetary union (the United
States) consisting of many such regions (states or commuting zones). Regions differ in their access
to finance due to different state-level deregulation histories. Each local economy consists of two
sectors: a manufacturing sector (M ) which produces a tradable good and a housing sector (H )
which produces a housing stock. Labor is perfectly mobile across sectors within the region but
immobile between different regions. Households consume services from the stock of housing
and a basket of differentiated home-produced and imported tradable goods. Time is discrete and
indexed by t = 0, 1, 2...∞. Unless precision requires, we generally omit the location subscript l.
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4.1.1 Firms and production
The total endogenous supply of labor in region l in period t is Nt, which may be employed in





where AM is a constant total factor productivity and α ∈ (0, 1) is the output elasticity of labor
in the manufacturing sector.
The stock of housing evolves according to
Ht = (1− δ)Ht−1 + YH,t, (3)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a depreciation rate of the housing stock and YH,t is the production of new
housing (construction andmaintenance). The production of new housing depends on the amount




whereAH is a constant total factor productivity and η ∈ (0, 1) is the output elasticity of labor in
the housing sector. Since labor is perfectly mobile between both sectors but not across regions,
the wages equalize within a region in each time period
Wt ≡ WM,t = WH,t. (5)
4.1.2 Household preferences and constraints
The demand side of each regional economy is given by a representative householdwhomaximizes















where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set available at the
beginning of the time period t. β is the intertemporal subjective discount factor, σ and ν are
inverses of the intertemporal elasticities of substitution for consumption and labor supply re-
spectively. The consumption bundle Xt is given by a CES-aggregation over the consumption of


















where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the expenditure share going to the tradable goods and θ is the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and housing services.
The consumption bundle of the tradable manufacturing goods, Ct, is composed of the home-
produced manufacturing good CM,t and the composite good CI,t which is imported from the

















whereϕ ∈ (0, 1) is the expenditure share going to the home-producedmanufacturing good andϑ
is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home-produced and imported goods. The
tradable price index is then given by
PC,t =
[





where PM,t is the price index of domestic manufactured goods and PI,t is the price index of
imported goods which we normalize to one. Hence, sincePM,t defines the region’s terms of trade,
it is the source of an exogenous shock in our model. Specifically, we will think of a drop in PM,t
as the direct consequence of import competition from China.
We will generally assume that households spend the bulk of their tradable expenditures on
CI,t,so that the share of expenditures ϕ going to the home-produced manufactured good, CM,t,
is relatively small. This captures the idea that the fallout from import exposure is locally con-
centrated: the local economy specializes in production of the manufacturing goodM = M(s),
but goodM(s) accounts only for a small part of the consumption expenditures of households in
region s. Hence a negative shock to the terms-of-trade PM(s) has a big negative impact on local
incomes but it does not substantially lower households’ cost of living.
With these assumptions, we can nowwrite the household’s period budget constraint expressed




















where πC,t denotes inflation of the tradable price index, Πt = ΠM,t + ΠH,t are profits from
ownership of firms in the manufacturing and housing sectors, Bt is the end-of-period t nominal
one-period debt, and it is the nominal interest rate.
4.1.3 Financial openness
Households in different regions differ in their access to finance. Following Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), we capture such differences in reduced form by as-















where i∗ is an exogenous U.S.-wide interest rate and Bt/Yt represents the ratio of debt to GDP
and b—its steady-state level. Importantly, we assume regions to differ in the sensitivity parameter
ω = ω(l) > 0. While we do not attempt to provide a micro-foundation for such differences in ω
here, we can more generally think of this parameter as the inverse of the credit supply elasticity
of the region’s banking system. In fact, as we discuss and illustrate empirically in section 7 below,
the lending supply of the banking system in states that liberalized their banking system early is
indeed more elastic than in states that liberalized later. Hence, for early (late) liberalizers, the
regional interest rate spread over the U.S.-wide rate is quite insensitive (sensitive) to local credit
demand Bt, suggesting a low (high) ω.
Equation (11) closes our model of a small open regional economy.
4.1.4 First order and equilibrium conditions







Decreasing marginal productivity of labor implies positive profits in both sectors, i.e.
ΠM,t = (1− α)PM,tYM,t, (14)
ΠH,t = (1− η)PH,tYH,t. (15)











Hence, for a given relative productivity the sector with a higher output price will attract a higher
share of labor in the economy. Equation (16) is central for understanding the role of house prices
for sectoral reallocation in our model. If households cannot borrow following the China trade
shock, i.e. after an exogenous decline in PM , then demand for housing will collapse as well and
house prices will decline in lockstepwithPM , leaving the sectoral allocation unchanged. If house-
holds have access to finance however, this will stabilize their demand for housing, keeping house
prices up. The increase in the relative price of housing will increase the production of housing,
leading to a reallocation of labor away from manufacturing.
The first order conditions implied by the maximization of (6) subject to the consumption
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where πH,t+1 denotes inflation of the house price index. The first condition is the standard bond
Euler equation and the second condition is the familiar labor supply function. The third condi-
tion, (19), describes the household’s choice between the consumption of the non-durable, trad-
able (manufacturing) good and the durable, non-tradable good, housing. It equates the relative
marginal utility of tradable and housing consumption to the user cost of housing expresed here
in terms of tradable consumption .
To understand how household access to finance stabilizes housing prices after a deterioration
of the terms-of-trade, consider how a temporary drop in PM plays out in financially closed and
financially open regions. In both regions, the terms-of-trade shock reduces today’s income and
induces households to borrow in order to smooth consumption. In a financially closed region, this
increased borrowing demandwill increase the nominal interest rate it very strongly (according to
equation (11)), forcing the households to accept a large drop in tradable consumption today. Since
housing is durable, its stock cannot drop verymuch in the short run, so that the decline in tradable
consumption induces a drop in the ratio Ct/Ht, thus increasing the relative marginal utility of
tradable consumption relative to housing. According to equation (19), the user cost of housing
has to drop as well, which, given future expected house prices, requires a drop in the relative price
PH/PC,t. Consider the financially open region next. Here, the households will easily be able to
smooth tradable consumption, since the nominal interest rate does not increase very much. As
a consequence, the relative marginal utility of tradable consumption does not increase by much
and the required drop in house prices is dampened.
2
Finally, the demand structure for tradable goods given in equation (8) implies linear income
expansion path for both home-produced and imported manufacturing goods. Hence, we can
express the home-produced and imported consumption of manufactured goods, CM and CI , as








The difference between the financially open and closed economies would be quantitatively exacerbated in a
model with a collateral constraint such as Monacelli (2009). For the financially closed economy, the drop in housing
prices would tighten the collateral constraint, limiting the ability to borrow even further. We note, however, that the
fundamental mechanisms here is independent of the presence of a collateral constraint.
12







Acompetitive equilibrium in region l is a set of allocations {Xt, Ct, CM,t, CI,t, Ht, Nt, NM,t, NH,t, Bt}
and a system of prices {Wt, PH,t, rt} such that, given the exogenous prices of home-produced
and imported manufacturing goods, PM,t and PI,t: i) {Xt, Ct, CM,t, CI,t, Ht, Nt, Bt} solve the
household’s optimality conditions (17), (18), (19), (20), and (21) subject to the budget constraint
(10), the consumption bundles (7), (8), and the interest rate (11), ii) {NM,t, NH,t} solve the opti-
mality conditions in the manufacturing and housing production, (12) and (13), iii) and the labor
market clears, i.e. NM,t +NH,t = Nt.
4.2 Empirical predictions of the model
The benchmark parameterization of ourmodel is based on the parameter values used inMonacelli
(2009) and Ferrero (2015). The household’s discount factor is set β = 0.98. The coefficient of
relative risk aversion σ and the inverse of labor supply elasticity ν are both set equal to one.
The intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of tradable goods and housing
services θ is set equal to one. The share of tradable goods in the consumption aggregate index is
set γ = 0.8. The elasticity of substitution between home-produced and imported tradable goods
ϑ equals 2. The share of home-producedmanufacturing good in the tradable consumption basket
is setϕ = 0.3. The elasticities of labor in the manufacturing and housing sectors are set α = 0.35
and η = 0.65, respectively. Finally, we choose an annual depreciation rate of the housing stock
δ = 0.04.
In our exposition we focus on two polar cases. RegionE (which we associate with early liber-
alizers) is assumed to be financially more integrated (ωE = 0.01) so that households can borrow
at the union-wide interest rate iE,t ≈ i∗. By contrast, region L (which we associate with late
liberalizers) is assumed to be financially less integrated (ωL = 1), and the local interest rate is
sensitive to the level of outstanding debt. Otherwise, regions E and L are identical. Further we
assume that households in both regions start with a zero debt, i.e. B0 = 0, such that the monetary
union interest rate in steady-state is i∗ = 1/β − 1.
We introduce uncertainty in this economy and assume that the logarithmic price of home-
produced tradable good follows a first-order autoregressive process,
lnPM,t = ρlnPM,t−1 + εt, (22)
where εt is an exogenous shock to the current price level in the manufacturing sector (e.g. due to
import competition), ρ ∈ (0, 1) captures the persistence of the shocks, and the initial price level
of home-produced manufacturing good, PM,0, is normalized to one.
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Suppose now that in the first time period the whole monetary union is hit by a persistent im-
port competition shock (ρ = 0.97) such that the price of home-produced tradable good, PM,1,
falls (e.g., ε1 = −0.1).3 However, the price of imported tradable goods remains the same, i.e.
PI,t = 1 .
4
Figure 2 shows the impact of this terms-of-trade shock on the key variables in our
model in regions E and L: the real wage, the relative price of housing services, employment in
themanufacturing and housing sectors, real consumption, and real household debt. Consider first
the late deregulation region L. After the terms-of-trade shock, production of the manufacturing
goods drops in line with manufacturing wages. Since households essentially cannot borrow, they
have to reduce consumption, which also affects demand for the locally produced non-tradable
consumption good, housing. The drop in the price of housing has two effects: on the one hand,
it lowers wages in the housing sector, limiting the incentive to reallocate labor frommanufactur-
ing to housing production. On the other hand, since housing is a stock variable there will also
be a negative wealth effect from the drop in the price of housing that exacerbates the drop in
consumption.
5
Now consider the early deregulation region E. Since credit supply in region E is relatively
more elastic, households start to borrow in order to smooth their consumption after the terms-
of-trade shock, inducing the economy to run a current account deficit. In particular, borrowing
also allows households to uphold demand for housing services, stabilizing the price of housing.
This makes housing production relatively more attractive than manufacturing, keeping up the
marginal revenue product of labor in the housing sector. Since wages have to equalize between
two sectors, the optimality condition in production (16) implies that labor starts to be reallocated
from the manufacturing to the housing sector.
Hence, themain prediction of ourmodel is that, for a given decline in the price of domestically
manufactured goods (terms-of-trade shock), the negative impact on the price of housing and thus
on consumption and wages is mitigated in the financially more open economy. Since housing
production is relatively more attractive in the financially integrated region, it should also see
a stronger reallocation of labor away from the import-exposed manufacturing sector towards
housing sector along with the relatively more stable wages. The key mechanism through which
financial integration affects real outcomes in our model is its stabilizing impact on consumer
demand. This is in contrast with much of the earlier literature that has emphasized how firm-
level access to finance helped in cushioning external shocks. In the remainder of the paper we
seek to confront the predictions of our model with the data.
3
For expositional simplicity, we assume here that both regions have the same degree of exposure to this shock.
Clearly, our empirical analysis will allow the import exposure to differ along the lines of Autor et al. (2013).
4
This formulation allows us to properlymodel a terms-of-trade shock, inwhich an exogenous shock to the current
price level in the domestic tradable sector does not necessarily affect tradable prices in the rest of the world.
5
Qualitatively, our results would also hold in a model in which the non-traded good is not a stock variable such
as housing. The wealth effect does however increase the magnitude of the effects discussed here.
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5 Data and Measurements
Our industry-level data comes from theCountyBusiness Patterns (CBP) provided by theU.S. Cen-
sus Bureau. The CBP provides subnational economic statistics on U.S. business establishments at
the state and county levels. The data is arranged by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
System from 1990 to 1997 and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) from
1998 to 2007, which we call sectors hereinafter.
6
We use information on the number of estab-
lishments, employment, and annual payroll (which is defined as a sum of wages and salaries paid
during one year to all employees) at the 2-digit SIC-level. Furthermore, for each sector we calcu-
late averagewage per employee as annual payroll divided by the total number of employees in that
sector. We follow Autor et al. (2013) and aggregate our county-level data to the commuting-zone
level using the crosswalk files from Autor and Dorn (2013) to map counties to the commuting
zones and the commuting zones to the states.
Data on GDP, personal income, consumption expenditures, population, and price indexes
come from the Regional Economic Accounts provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).We useConsumer Price Index (CPI) to deflate personal income, consumption expenditures,
annual payroll and average wages with a base year of 2009. Finally, data on house price indexes
at the state- and county-level are taken from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
7
Our indicator of the terms-of-trade shock to local economies is themeasure ofChinese import
exposure constructed by Autor et al. (2013). For each industry, Chinese imports to the U.S. are
apportioned to each local economy according to its share of national employment in that industry.
Since our analysis makes use of an annual panel data, we extend the import exposure measure by
Autor et al. (2013) to the annual frequency, using annual trade flow data for 2-digit SIC industries
for the U.S. from 1991 to 2007.
8
Furthermore, similar to this study, we use information on local
industry employment structure (both at the state and commuting-zone levels) for the same time
period from the CBP data. Then, Chinese import exposure per worker (∆IE
l
t) in location (state or
commuting-zone) l in year t is the employment-weighted average of year-to-year changes in U.S.
imports from China relative to total U.S. employment in industry i (∆IMucit
Luit−1












Since aggregate U.S. imports from China in industry i could be correlated with U.S. demand,
we follow Autor et al. (2013) and identify the supply-driven component of Chinese import expo-
6
The SIC is a United States government system for classifying industries, which was replaced by the
NAICS starting in 1998. We applied the concordances between the both systems published by the U.S.


















where ∆IMocjt is a change in Chinese exports to eight other high-income countries.
9
Unless
otherwise noted, equation (24) is the main measure of Chinese import exposure that we use in the
empirical analysis in this paper.
As discussed in section 2, our empirical analysis exploits the fact that the U.S. experienced a
period of significant deregulation of the banking industry since the 1970s until the early 1990s
(Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). Since states deregulated in different years, there was a considerable
heterogeneity at the state level in the degree of financial liberalization when the local economy
was hit by the China trade shock in the beginning of the 1990s. We compute our deregulation
index (1) based on information provided in Table 1 by Kroszner and Strahan (1999). It equals the
number of years that have passed until 1995 since a state adopted either intrastate branching and
interstate banking deregulation laws.
10
Hence, more financially integrated states are associated
with a larger financial deregulation index, since these states began deregulating their banking
sector further in the past.
11
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the key state-level variables used in our analysis. It
also splits the whole sample into two groups of states that deregulated their banking sector be-
fore and after 1985. For each variable and groups of states we calculate the population weighted
cross-state mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum value. Note that early
and late deregulation states are similar in terms of the average total employment growth over
the 1991-2007 period. However, early deregulation states experienced a stronger decline in the
manufacturing employment, and at the same time, a faster growth in the real estate employment,
average wage, consumption, mortgage loans, and house prices compared to the late deregulation
states, which is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. Note also that early and
late deregulation states are very similar in terms of their Chinese import exposure.
6 Empirical Framework and identification
We conduct our analysis at two levels of aggregation. First, at the state-level, which gives us an
annual panel of 48 U.S. states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) for the period from 1991 to 2007.
Secondly, we follow Autor et al. (2013) and conduct our analysis also at the commuting zone
level. This has the advantage of considerable finer geographical granularity since there are 722
commuting zones.
9
These countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland
10
With the exception of Iowa, all states had deregulated both interstate banking and intrastate branching laws by
1995. Iowa liberalized intrastate branching only in 1997.
11
Our measurement of state financial openness is consistent with the deregulation measures used in Hoffmann
and Stewen (2020) and Mian et al. (2020). In fact, our main results are robust to using these alternative measures of
financial openness.
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At each level of aggregation, we estimate panel equations of the following general form:




t × DIs(l) + β3X lt + αl + τt + εlt, (25)
where l indexes the state or commuting zone. The dependent variable ∆Y lt stands for a range
of local outcomes, including labor market variables (wages and employment in the tradable and
non-tradable sectors), non-tradable prices (in particular housing prices), but also other local out-
comes such as income, consumption and unemployment. ∆IE
l
t is our location-specific measure
of a change in Chinese import exposure per worker, and DI
s(l)
is our measure of state financial
openness, i.e. the number of years elapsed until 1995 that state s, in which commuting zone l
is located, has been open.
12
The vectorX lt contains a rich set of controls that vary by location
and year, such as population growth and the share government expenditures in total GDP. It also
includes various interactions of ∆IE
l
t with the pre-sample location characteristics and interactions
between DI
s(l)
and aggregate macro variables that we discuss below. Finally, αl and τt represent
location and year fixed effects respectively. Note that, since DI
s(l)
varies by location only, its first
order effect in regression (25) is absorbed by the location fixed-effect. All our regressions are
weighted using a state’s or commuting zone’s share of national population in 1990 and we report
robust standards errors clustered by state throughout.
Regression (25) is a differences-in-differences (DiD) specification. This specification will cor-
rectly identify the ’causal’ effect of how financial openness modulates the China trade shock, i),
if ∆IE
l
t does not affect outcomes through other state characteristics that are correlated with DI
and, ii), if ∆IElt is uncorrelated with local demand for imports or with aggregate shocks that could
themselves be modulated through financial openness.
To address the first concern, our vector of control variables includes a range of interactions of
∆IE
l
t with other pre-sample state-level characteristics that could correlate cross-sectionally with
DI
s(l)
, such as the growth rates of tradable and non-tradable GDP, employment, wages, and the
house price growth in the decade before 1991. Specifically, a broad literature has documented the
impact of banking deregulation in the 1980’s on economic growth and the correlation of business
cycles (Morgan, Rime and Strahan, 2004), trade (Michalski and Ors, 2012), the relative size of
tradable and non-tradable sectors, and the growth rate of consumer credit (Mian et al., 2020) as




To address the second challenge, we include interactions of DI
s(l)
with a range of aggregate
variables, such as the stance of monetary policy, U.S. capital inflows, measures of credit availabil-
ity and demand for housing from Hoffmann and Stewen (2020), which is discussed in more detail
in the appendix. We collect these aggregate common factors in the vector Ft. Including the in-
teractions DI
s(l)×Ft controls for a possible correlation of ∆IElt× DIs(l) with aggregate, U.S.-wide
shocks that occurred during our sample period.
12
Clearly, when the regression is run at the state-level, s(l) = l for state l.
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6.1 State-level results
This subsection presents results for regression ((25)) estimated at the state level. All regressions
presented here are based on annual data for 48 states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and are esti-
mated by OLS, using ∆IE
s
ot as our measure of import exposure. All regressions feature state- and
year-fixed effects.
A key prediction of our model is that household access to finance stabilizes consumption and
keeps house prices up. This in turn leads to higher wages and income, and finally a reallocation
towards the housing sector. Tables 2 to 7 show that this mechanism is borne out in state-level
data. In all tables, column (1) shows the results for the set of baseline controls. Columns (2) and
(3) respectively, add the controls for the interactions of ∆IE with the set of state-level pre-sample
characteristics, PRE
s
, and the interaction between DI and a range of aggregate factors, Ft. As
discussed in the beginning of the section, the first set of controls captures the effect of the China
shock on the local economy through other vectors of transmission, while DI
s(l) × Ft allows for
an impact of the aggregate economy to vary depending on the state’s financial openness. Finally,
column (4) considers all controls together.
Table 2 starts with the results for house prices. As expected, house prices are adversely affected
by the China trade shock, i.e. the coefficient on the stand-alone term ∆IE is negative and statisti-
cally significant throughout. However, the adverse impact of the shock is substantially mitigated
in financially more integrated states. The coefficient on the interaction ∆IE
l
t×DIs(l) is significantly
positive and stable across specifications. This dampening effect is economically sizeable: The co-
efficient estimate of around 0.06 implies that for a state with an average level of import exposure
(around 0.02,see Table 1) annual house price growth was 0.12 percent higher for each year that
the state liberalized earlier. From Table 1, the difference in the number of years since liberal-
ization between the early and late deregulation groups is around 13 years. This implies that the
average early-deregulation state would have experienced an annual growth rate in house prices
that was 1.56 percent higher than a state that liberalized late. Over the 16 years of our sample
period (1991-2007), this amounts to an almost 25 percent difference in the level of house prices.
13
Table3 presents the results for state-level consumption growth. Again, all four specifications
suggest that financial liberalization considerably dampens the impact of the China trade shock.
The coefficient on the stand-alone term ∆IE of around−0.3would imply that a state with average
levels of import exposure would experience a drop in annual consumption growth by around 0.6
percentage points. The coefficient on the interaction term ∆IE× DI of around 0.01 suggests that
for such a state, liberalizing 10 years earlier would have increased annual consumption growth
by more than 0.2 percentage points, thus reducing the original impact of the China trade shock
on consumption growth by around a third.
13
It is instructive to compare these numbers with the effects that the China trade shock may have had on house
prices without banking liberalization: the stand-alone coefficient on ∆IE is around −2.5, which suggests that at
average levels of import exposure a state would have seen a lower house price growth by up to five percent per year
if the state had not liberalized at all by 1995.
18
Table 4 turns to the results for wage growth. Again our estimated coefficient of interest is
significant and stable across specifications. With an average level of 0.15 − 0.18 it implies that
liberalizing ten years earlier would have increased annual wage growth by between 0.3 and 0.4
percentage points per year for a state with average levels of import exposure. This compares with
a drop of annual wage growth by around half a percentage point that would have experienced
by this state (based on the stand-alone coefficient on ∆IE of around−0.25) had it not liberalized.
Again, this suggests that financial liberalization considerably softened the blow of the China trade
shock on local economies.
In Table 5, we also estimate the model (25) with the growth rate of state personal income per
capita obtained from the NIPA tables. Personal income is a broader definition of income than
wages since it also includes incomes of local business owners and therefore allows us to capture
the wider impact of the China trade shock on the local economy. Also, the CBP employment
data contain both full-time and part-time employees, which could affect the precision with which
average wages aremeasured. Again, all specifications suggest that financial openness considerably
mitigated the impact of the China trade shock on local economies. The stand-alone coefficient
on ∆IE of around −0.5 would imply that a state with average import exposure would have seen
one percentage point lower annual income growth over our sample period. However, the range
of estimates of our coefficient on the interaction DI × ∆IE implies that that liberalizing ten years
earlier would have dampened this decline by between 0.4 and 0.6 percentage points.
Table 6 explores the implications for state-level employment growth. Panel A shows the re-
sults for total employment, panels B and C for manufacturing and real estate employment re-
spectively. The estimated coefficients for total employment growth on the stand-alone ∆IE-term
are in line with the findings in Autor et al. (2013) suggesting a significant negative impact of the
Chinese import exposure not only on the number of employees in the manufacturing sector, but
across all sectors. The point estimates on the interaction term ∆IE× DI are positive but generally
not significant. Early liberalization did not generally increase total employment growth.
Instead it affected the sectoral composition of the economy. Turning to manufacturing em-
ployment (Panel B), we continue to find small and insignificant coefficients on ∆IE× DI, while the
stand-alone coefficients on ∆IE are all significantly negative. For employment growth in the real
estate sector (Panel C), however, financial openness significantly mitigates the fallout from the
China trade shock, with the interaction term positive and significant throughout. This suggests
that financial openness favored the reallocation of labor towards the housing sector following the
China trade shock.
We conclude this subsection by estimating the effect of Chinese import competition on state-
level unemployment rates (Table 7).
14
While our model does not feature an explicit labor market
friction, we can think of lower unemployment as an indirect indicator that local labor markets
are able to reallocate workers to other sectors of the economy. Indeed our results suggest that
financial openness dampened the adverse effect of the China shock on state-level unemployment.
14
The data on unemployment rate at the state level are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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At average levels of import exposure, a state would have experienced an increase in the unem-
ployment rate by around 0.25 − 0.5 percentage points. According to our estimates, liberalizing
ten years earlier would have dampened this increase in unemployment by around 0.15 percentage
points.
6.2 Results at commuting-zone level
Tables 8 through 11 provide robustness analysis of our findings at the commuting zone (CZ)
level. Our sample includes 722 CZs which covers the entire mainland of the United States (both
metropolitan and rural areas). Using CZs’ local labor markets as sub-economies in our analy-
sis has several advantages. First, it provides a larger sample. Second, CZs are logical geographic
units for defining local labor markets and they differ in their exposure to import competition as a
result of regional variation in industry specialization (Autor et al., 2013). Thus, moving to the CZ-
level also allows us to use a much more geographically granular version of the import exposure
measure in our estimations.
15
Table 8 provides estimation results for the growth rate of housing prices in the CZs, which
are calculated as population weighted averages of house price indexes in the related counties. The
results are very similar to the estimated coefficients reported in Table 2 at the state level.
Tables 9 and 10 show CZ-level results for the growth rates of average wage and personal in-
come respectively. It is evident that the average wage and personal income have been significantly
less affected by Chinese import competition in the CZs associated with the early deregulation
states, again in line with the predictions of the model and with our previous state-level results.
Table 11 reports estimation results for total employment (Panel A) and employment in the
manufacturing and real estate sectors (Panels B and C respectively). The results confirm that the
Chinese imports exposure has caused a significantly negative effect on total employment growth
also at theCZ-level. This negative effect has beenmitigated primarily through higher employment
growth in the real estate sector in those CZs, where banking markets were more integrated, i.e.
the estimated coefficient on the interaction term DI × ∆IE in Panel C is positive. The results in
Table (11) are generally somewhat less conclusively significant than the corresponding results
for employment at the state-level. However, we note that all of the specifications in the table
contain CZ-fixed and time effects in addition to the highly demanding set of controls from the
state-level data, while the treatment (banking deregulation) necessarily remains at the state-level.
Nonetheless, the estimated coefficients are almost identical to the ones obtained from the state-
level regressions and remain remarkably stable across specifications.
The commuter-zone level results clearly corroborate our earlier state-level findings: theChina
trade shock has caused a significantly negative impact on local labor markets and non-tradable
prices; however, financiallymore integrated regionswere able towithstand the "China Syndrome"
15
See section 5 above for details. Unfortunately, we cannot explore the impact of the China trade shock and
deregulation on consumption at the CZ level, since time series on consumption are not available at the county-level.
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better. Household access to finance stabilized local private demand and in particular housing
prices, which in turn facilitated the reallocation of labor away from manufacturing towards the
housing sector.
6.3 Dynamic responses
In this section, we address the question of how persistent the trade shock effects are and we look
at the dynamic responses of local outcomes after the China trade shock. For this purpose, we
apply a local linear projection method first suggested by Jordà (2005). The cumulative growth in
a local outcome ∆Y l from year t to year t+ h is regressed on Chinese import exposure in year t:
∆Y lt,t+h = βh∆IE
l
t + α
l + τt + ε
l
t+h, (26)
where αl and τt represent location and year fixed effects respectively. Then we collect the esti-
mated coefficients of βh for different forecasting horizons h and plot them for two samples of
early and late deregulation states.
Figure 3 shows the estimation results for our state-level data. It is evident that the Chinese
import exposure has a significant and persistent negative effect on the growth rate of the man-
ufacturing employment in both samples of early and late deregulation states. The growth rate
of real estate employment tends to increase in early deregulation states and to decrease in late
deregulation states during the first years after the China trade shock. However, the effect on the
growth rate of the real estate employment is not persistent, i.e. the coefficients become statistically
insignificant three years after the shock. Furthermore, the China trade shock has a significant and
persistently negative impact on the growth rates of average wage, personal income, consumption,
and house prices in the sample of late deregulation states, but not in the sample of early deregula-
tion states. These findings are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model: financially
more integrated states should see a swifter reallocation of labor from the import exposed man-
ufacturing sector into the non-tradable sector, and smaller declines in wages, consumption, and
non-tradable prices following the terms-of-trade shock.
7 Evidence from bank-county level data
Our empirical results so far lend support to the mechanism highlighted in the theoretical model:
banking systems in financially more open states could accommodate the increased borrowing de-
mand of households. This stabilized local demand, kept non-tradable (and in particular: housing)
prices high and faciliated the reallocation of workers to the non-tradable sector. However, so far
we have not shown that households actually started to borrow more following the China trade
shock—as our interpretation of the shock as a credit demand shock would require. Also, our
stylized model does not spell out why banks in states that liberalized earlier should have a more
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elastic response to households’ increased credit demand. We address these two points in this sec-
tion. First, we show that higher import exposure did indeed lead to higher credit demand and,
secondly, that geographically diversified banks were more elastic in their lending supply response
to these local credit demand shocks. Since early-liberalized states had a stronger presence of geo-
graphically diversified banks, these findings help understand our state-level results. We illustrate
these points using highly disaggregated bank-county level data on mortgage refinancing from the
home mortgage disclosure act (HMDA) data base. Using these granular data will also allow us to
overcome potential remaining challenges to identification that we cannot directly address at the
state or commuting zone levels.
The HMDA data base collects all mortgage applications by private households in the United
States handled by financial institutions that exceed a low, annually adjusted threshold inmortgage
assets. It contains detailed information about the geographical location of the property, whether
the application was successful (i.e. the mortgage loan was granted) and the loan size. Impor-
tantly, the HMDA records also provide information about the purpose of the mortgage loans,
i.e. whether it was granted for the purchases of a new property or whether the mortgage consti-
tutes a refinancing or mortgage equity withdrawal by the household. In our analysis, we focus on
refinancing demand and mortgage equity withdrawals because these are the types of mortgage
lending that actually allow households to smooth consumption in the face of adverse shocks to
earnings. By contrast, borrowing for the purchase of a new home is usually not driven by con-
sumption smoothing motives.
The HMDA also provides information about the financial institution that processed the loan,
such as its regulatory ID number, the institution type (commercial bank, credit or savings union,
mortgage company), total assets as well as the institution’s home state. This allows us to identify
whether a bank is locally headquartered or from another state. Furthermore, the data also allow
us tomeasure the geographical diversification of an institution’smortgage portfolio. We aggregate
the HMDA data to obtain the annual growth rates of mortgage lending by institution and county
for the period 1995-2007. Our analysis includes all counties in one of the 722 commuting zones
defined by Autor et al. (2013).
Our interest is in identifying howbanks react to the location- (i.e. county-) specific component
of credit demand of which we conjecture that it is a function of the local economy’s exposure to
Chinese import competition. We therefore need to disentangle the supply component of bank
lending from the local credit demand component. To this end, following Amiti and Weinstein
(2018); Hoffmann and Stewen (2020) we consider the following decomposition of the growth rate











At a later stage of our analysis, wewill distinguish further between banks that were affected by banking deregula-
tion in a state and other financial institutions (such as mortgage companies) that were not. Whenever this distinction
does not matter, however, we refer to all financial institutions as “banks” for brevity.
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Here, βbt is a bank-time-specific effect and γ
c
t is a county-time effect and ν
b,c
t a residual that we
assume is i.i.d across institutions and counties as well as over time. The county-time effect γct is
free of bank-specific supply factors and we can therefore think of it as the demand component of
mortgage lending in county c that is common to all banks that are active in the county. Conversely,
sinceβbt varies only by bank, it reflects the bank-specific supply component that affects all counties
in which bank b is active.
To obtain economically meaningful bank-specific supply and local-specific demand factors,
we build on Hoffmann and Stewen (2020) who adapt the method proposed by Amiti and Wein-
stein (2018) for matched bank-firm data to our setting here. The method proposed by Amiti and
Weinstein (2018) offers two key advantages that are relevant in our context here.
First, the method yields estimates of βbt and γ
c
t that are consistent with aggregation. It there-
fore explicitly takes account of the granular structure of the banking sector which is characterized
by a few relatively large banks dominating many local markets.
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To illustrate how the restrictions imposed by aggregation help identify βbt and γ
c
t , we follow


















the vector of shares of each county in bank b’s country-wide mortgage portfolio. Stack the bank-
time and county-time effects into the vectors βt and γt respectively and let Λt be the B × C
matrix of bank-county-level growth rates withΛb:t its b-th row andΛ
:c
t its c-th column. Then, the




















wherewe have used that the elements ofφbt−1 andω
c









b,cνb,ct go to zero for sufficiently largeB and C . Amiti and
Weinstein (2018) show that the two sets of moment conditions (28) and (29) uniquely identify (up
to normalization) the vectors βt and γt. Hence, there is only one solution to the decomposition
17
Bremus et al. (2018) and show that shocks to big banks have a disproportionate effect on macroeconomic out-
comes at the international level.
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(27) that satisfies the condition that the (market or portfolio share) weighted sums of bank and
county effects sum to county- and bank-wide aggregates respectively.
The second advantage of the method by Amiti and Weinstein (2018) is that it allows to deal
with the creation of new lending relationships between banks and counties.
18
This is important in
our setting, because both intra-state branching as well as interstate deregulation during the 1980s
and early 1990s led to the entry of many new banks into local (county-level) banking markets
and this process continued well after the de iure liberalization of state-level markets had been
completed. To obtain credible estimates of the supply and demand components of local credit, it
is therefore important to explicitly allow for the adjustment in banks’ lending supply along the
extensive margin.
7.1 Estimating banks’ responses to county-level credit demand









− βbt = γct + ν
b,c
t
We can think of LR
b,c
t as the endogenous response of the bank’s lending to local credit demand,
given the bank’s lending supply curve. Our conjecture is that more geographically diversified
banks have more elastic lending supply so that they respond more strongly to variations in local
credit demand. The reason for this conjecture is that geographicallymore diversified banks have a
higher risk-taking capacity which makes them more willing to satisfy local credit demand.
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Fig-
ure 4 illustrates this effect: the two banks are faced with the same credit demand shock, but since
the integrated bank has a more elastic supply curve, its lending supply responds more strongly to
the increase in demand.




t = α× ∆IE
CZ(c)
t + δ × ∆IE
CZ(c)
t × DIVbt−1 + CONTROLS (30)
where ∆IE
CZ(c)
t is import exposure affecting the commuting zone to which county c belongs and
here acts as the stand-in for the local credit demand shock and DIV
b
t captures the geographical
diversification of the bank. The vector CONTROLS includes a range of bank-, county- and state-
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Amiti andWeinstein show that the weighted-least squares estimate of the decomposition (27) with weightsLb,ct−1
satisfies the moment conditions (28) and (29) if and only if there is no new lending along the extensive margin, i.e. if
banks only lend to counties to which they already had a lending relationship. In the general case when there is new
lending along the extensive margin, the moment conditions have to be solved explicitly for βt and γt, which requires
the solution of a (B + C − 2)-dimensional system of linear equations for each period t. This is the approach we
follow in our analysis here.
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In a simple model in which banks face a value at risk constraint (see e.g. Shin (2012) and Hoffmann and Stewen
(2020), The maximum leverage the bank can take in this model will be inversely related to the risk of its portfolio—
and thus positively related to its geographic diversification). In this setting it can easily be shown that banks with
lower notional portfolio risk will increase lending more in response to a positive credit demand shock.
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year fixed effects aswell as the standalone termofDIV
b
t . Our conjecture is that the estimates of both
α and δ are positive. A positive value ofαwould imply that higher import exposure would lead to
higher loan demand, vindicating our claim that the China trade shock was indeed a loan demand
shock. Furthermore, a positive value of δ would imply that geographically more diversified banks
actually were more elastic in their credit supply, satisfying demand to a larger extent than local
banks. Finally, twe include the standalone term for DIV
b
t−1 in the set of controls.









where L(b) is the set of locations in which bank b is active and where the φb,lt−1 reflects the share
of location l in the bank’s mortgage portfolio from the previous section. Hence DIVbt corresponds
to the inverse square root of the Herfindahl index of the bank’s credit portfolio. If the bank’s
returns are independently and identically distributed across locations l, the denominator of DIVbt
is directly proportional to the standard deviation of the bank’s portfolio return.
20
The empiri-
cal question we face is at which level of aggregation this assumption about the independence of
location-specific shocks is actually satisfied. Our data is sufficiently granular to allow us to com-
pute DIV
b
t at the county-level. However, as discussed in Hoffmann and Stewen (2020), this could
be misleading if the shocks affecting individual counties are correlated within a commuting zone
or even within the state. For robustness, we therefore report results for the bank-county-level
regression using versions of DIV
b
t computed at the county, commuting zone, and state levels.
Table 12 shows the results for the bank-county level regression (30) for the “treatment group”
of financial institutions that were affected by the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. com-
mercial banks. Columns (1) shows the regression with import exposure alone. Columns (2)-(4)
for the specifications with the interaction between import exposures and DIV
b
t−1 computed at the
county, commuting zone and state levels. Column (5) shows the results of a specification where a
bank’s geographic diversification is calculated based on the the history of deregulation of its home
state and the states in which is active. We discuss the construction of this diversification measure
in detail in the next subsection. All regressions control for bank-county fixed effects as well as for
state-year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
In all regressions the coefficient α is positive and significant. This supports the view that
higher import exposure is indeed associated with a higher demand for refinancing or mortgage
equity withdrawal: exposure to Chinese import competition acts like a positive credit demand
shock. Turning to the coefficient δ on the interaction term between import exposure and bank-
level diversification, we again find significantly positive coefficients throughout. Hence, geograph-
ically more diversified banks are indeed more elastic in their response to local credit demand,
20
Note that the functional form of DIV
b
t (as a ratio) would be naturally arise as the marginal risk taking capacity of
a bank in a model in which the bank faces a value at risk constraint (see Hoffmann and Stewen (2020)).
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consistent with our hypothesis.
In Table 13, we report the same regressions, but now on a placebo sample of mortgage com-
panies that were not affected by the state-level banking deregulation of the 1980s. The business
model of mortgage companies is to originate and distribute mortgage loans. Hence, these insti-
tutions do not generally hold originated loans on their books for extended periods which would
suggest that their lending supply should not be affected by their geographic diversification. This
is exactly what we find the data: in the placebo the estimate of the coefficient δ on the interaction
term ∆IE
CZ(c)
t × DIVbt is much closer to zero than for the treatment group and generally insignif-
icant. Hence, financial institutions in the placebo sample do not generally differ in the elasticity
of their lending supply. Consistent with our interpretation of import competition as a loan de-





We have shown that import competition from China constituted a positive credit demand shock
and geographically diversified banks weremore elastic in their response to this shock. In this sub-
sectionwe illustrate that easier credit provision in response to the shock stabilized local economies
by attenuating the fall in house prices and that it was banking deregulation that made credit pro-
vision more elastic in the first place. To this end, we estimate the regression
∆hpict = a× LRct + b× ∆IE
CZ(c)
t + CONTROLS (32)









t , is the county-level lending response, aggregated over all banks in county c
and we expect the associated coefficient to be positive. The second term captures the presumably
negative impact of the China trade shock on local outcomes through all other channels. Even
though LR
c
t is free of bank-level lending supply shocks it is still likely to be correlated with a
range of local housing demand shocks. To isolate the component of the lending response that is
explained by the China trade shock, we build on our bank-county level results in the previous sub-
section. Following the approach of Gabaix and Koijen (2020) we construct an optimal granular
instrumental variable as the difference between amarket share weighted and a precisionweighted







where Tt−1(c) is the set of (treated) banks—those affected by deregulation—active in county c




t−1 = 0 to
be discussed shortly and L̃R
b,c
t denotes the bank-specific (idiosyncratic) component of the lending
response to the China trade shock. We refer to GLRct as the granular lending response.
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As we have shown in the previous subsection, banks differ in their lending responses because
more diversified banks have more elastic lending supply, so that we can write the idiosyncratic















The granularity term in parentheses,Gct−1, modulates the response of aggregate county-level lend-
ing to the import exposure shock. The question is how to choose the granular weights Γb,ct−1.
Gabaix and Koijen (2020) show that the optimal granular instrument—in the sense that it leads
to an efficient IV estimator—is given by the difference between a market share weighted and a









where the weights ωb,ct−1 reflect a bank’s market share of in the county whereas π
b,c
t−1 is a a set of
precisionweights that correct for bank-specific differences in the variability of lending. Following





















where the second equality follows directly from (34). The precision weights assign a low weight
to banks with very volatile lending responses. In the stylized model of Figure 4, all banks face the
same local demand shocks, so differences in the volatility of L̃R
b
are just a function of differences
in the elasticity of lending supply curves which are parametrized by DIV
b
t−1. Then, choosing the
weights Γb,ct−1 according to (36) above gives particular importance to the idiosyncratic lending
response of banks that have a high share in the local market and that are, at the same time, also
highly geographically diversified.
This raises the issue of how to measure the components of Γb,ct−1, i.e. banks’ market share ω
b,c
t−1
and their geographical diversification. A limitation of using de facto market shares is that their
cross-county variation could itself be the outcome of differences in the structure of local credit
demand. For example, if geographically diversified banks systematically aremore accommodative
of growing local credit demand, then over time they might have a systematically higher market
share than local banks. This in turn would also affect the geographical diversification of banks
active in these counties and thus also the precision weights πb,ct .
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To deal with this potential endogeneity, we build on and extend a procedure suggested by
Hoffmann and Stewen (2020) and construct de iure measure of ωb,ct−1 and DIVbt based on the regu-
latory history of the bank’s home state and of the states in which it is active. The measure makes
explicit use of the fact that the liberalization of a state’s banking market in most cases amounted
to a liberalization on a reciprocal basis. Specificially, we adapt the market share measure of Hoff-








× 1{s(c)6=s(b)} + 1{s(c)=s(b)} × INTRAs(c)∑
b∈Bt−1(c)
{
min {INTERs(c), INTERs(b)} × 1{s(c)6=s(b)} + 1{s(c)=s(b)} × INTRAs(c)
} (38)
where s(c) denotes the state to which county c belongs and s(b) denotes the home state of bank
b and where the variables INTER (INTRA) denote the number of years (until 1995) that have passed
since the interstate (intrastate branching) liberalization of the state’s banking market. Bt−1(c)
is the set of all banks (financial institutions) active in county c at time t − 1. To the extent






, is the number of years that the state s(c) in which bank b is active
has been open for banks from bank b’s home state, s(b): for banks from outside the state, i.e. for
which the indicator functions are 1{s(l)6=s(b)} = 1 and 1{s(l)=s(b)} = 0 , this number takes the
value INTER
s(c)
if the home state of the bank liberalized earlier than state s(c). For out-of-state
banks from states that liberalized later, it takes the value INTER
s(b)
. For local banks for which state
s(c) is the home state (1{s(c)6=s(b)} = 0, 1{s(c)=s(b)} = 1) it takes on the value INTRA
s(c)
.
The numerator therefore varies for each bank in state s(c) as a function of the bank’s home
state. The denominator just sums this bank-specific number across all (treated) banks active in





Hoffmann and Stewen (2020) suggest to interpret the weights ωb,ct−1 constructed according to
(38) as the hypothetical market share that bank b should have in county c if banks’ started to
enter the target market c at the earliest possible date and then grow their lending at a rate that is
equal across all banks. For each bank, this ‘as-if‘ share only depends on its own home state, the
regulation of the state to which the target market belongs as well as on the regulation of the home
states of the other banks that are active in c. Our identifying assumption is that this as-if measure
of ωb,ct−1 is uncorrelated with local demand conditions.
Based on the same assumptions, we can now also construct a de iure measure of the share of
county c in bank b’s portfolio, φb,ct−1, that we then use to construct a de iure bank-level diversi-
fication measure according to (31) above.
22
Specifically, for each bank we can look at the set of
counties in which the bank is active at the end of period t − 1,denoted by Ct−1(b) and ask for
howmany years (until 1995) the bank has legally been allowed to enter a given county. Again, the
21
These mutual reciprocal liberalizations were initially often limited to states in the region and later expanded to
the national level. We do not attempt to account for the complexity of these regional agreements here.
22
This is the measure we have also used on column (5) of Table 12.
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answer to this question is given by the numerator of (38), so that the notional share of county c







× 1{s(c)6=s(b)} + 1{s(c)=s(b)} × INTRAs(c)∑
c∈Ct−1(b)
{
min {INTERs(c), INTERs(b)} × 1{s(c)6=s(b)} + 1{s(c)=s(b)} × INTRAs(c)
} (39)




t−1 = 1 and—different from (38)
above—now runs across counties c for a given bank b.
Having constructed GLRct we now use it as an instrument for the county-level lending re-
sponse LR
c
t in the county-level house price regression (32). Table 14 provides the results for the
first and second stages. In the vector of controls we include lagged population and GDP growth.
We also include the interaction between a county fixed effect and the granular termGct−1 to control
for the possibility that other shocks than import exposure affect local house price outcomes. The
results of the first stage of reveal that GLRct is a powerful instrument for LRct ,with the extant F-
statistics exceeding the critical threshold of 10 (see Stock and Yogo (2005)) by a wide margin. The
second stage reveals a significant and positive coefficient on L̂R
c
t while the coefficient on ∆IE
c
t is
very significantly negative. These results buttress the fundamental mechanism underlying our
theoretical model: higher import exposure led to higher borrowing demand by households. In fi-
nancially more open counties, the banking system reacted more elastically to this credit demand.
This lending response stabilized demand for housing and thus house prices.
8 Conclusion
This paper has studied how financial integration allowed regional economies to cope with the
fallout from the China trade shock. Our empirical analysis exploits the wave of state-level bank-
ing deregulation that swept through the United States during the 1980’s. States that opened their
banking markets for out-of-state banks earlier, had a stronger presence of geographically diversi-
fied banks — and therefore more elastic credit supply responses to local loan demand shocks —
by the early 1990’s, when the China trade shock started to deteriorate the terms-of-trade of many
local economies across the United States. To guide our analysis, we propose a stylized model of
local economies in which financial openness is key in modulating the response to an exogenous
shock to the terms of trade. In financially more open economies, households can borrow more
easily in response to the negative shocks to wages and employment. This allows them to smooth
consumption stabilizing the demand for non-tradable goods. Because non-tradable prices (and
in particular house prices) do not decline as much as would be the case without access to credit,
wages in the non-tradable sector do not decline as strongly and the reallocation between the
import-exposed tradable and the non-tradable sectors takes place more swiftly.
Consistent with the model predictions, we find that house prices remained relatively stable in
financially more open states while household borrowing and debt increased more in states with
29
ample credit supply. Higher local house prices then favored a swifter reallocation of labor between
the import exposed manufacturing and the housing sector, stabilizing average wages, income and
employment in the non-tradable sector.
Our findings shed new light on how financial integration affects the response of economies
to external shocks. Much of the earlier literature has emphasized the role that banking dereg-
ulation across U.S. federal states played for credit supply, in particular for firms. By contrast,
our results illustrate how banking integration helped accommodate a major credit demand shock
by consumers and how the stabilization of consumer demand (through consumption smoothing)
accelerated the necessary sectoral reallocation of labor. At a general level, our results highlight
the importance of integrated markets for retail (consumer) finance in dealing with asymmetric
terms-of-trade shocks in monetary unions.
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Import Exposure
Late Deregulation States
Notes: The figure shows the long-run relationship between Chinese import exposure and the central variables of
interest for two samples of 23 early deregulation states and 25 late deregulation states (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)
during the period from 1991 to 2007. States that deregulated their banking sector before (after) 1985 are classi-
fied as early (late) deregulation states. The vertical axes measure the log change of the corresponding dependent
variable. The horizontal axes measure the change in import exposure per worker. All regressions are weighted
by start of the period state share of national population.
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Figure 2: Model Predictions - Benchmark Parameterization
Notes: this figure depicts the logarithmic changes in the endogenous variables from the steady-state levels after
a trade-of-term shock (ε1 = −0.1) for early (ωE = 0.01) and late (ωL = 1) deregulation states. The benchmark
parametrization of the model: α = 0.35, η = 0.65, β = 0.98, σ = 1, ν = 1, θ = 1, ϑ = 2, γ = 0.8, ϕ = 0.3,
ρ = 0.97, δ = 0.04.
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Notes: The figure shows dynamic effects of Chinese import exposure on the central variables of interest estimated
using the regression model (26). The sample includes 23 early deregulation states and 25 late deregulation states
(excl. Alaska andHawaii) during the period from 1991 to 2007. States that deregulated their banking sector before
(after) 1985 are classified as early (late) deregulation states. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and
are weighted by state share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
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Figure 4: Lending responses of geographically diversified and local banks
Lending supply of 
diversified bank
Lending supply of local






Notes: The figure illustrates the differential lending responses of geographically diversified
and local banks (i.e. those with locally concentrated portfolios) to local credit demand shocks.
The lower notional portfolio risk of the diversified bank leads to amore elastic lending supply.
Therefore, it increases its lending more for a given local demand shock.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All States Early Deregulation States Late Deregulation States
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Change in Import Exposure per Worker .022 .018 -.034 .072 .023 .018 -.034 .071 .022 .018 -.026 .069
Instrument for Change in Import Exposure .017 .016 -.019 .059 .017 .016 -.019 .059 .016 .015 -.016 .054
Deregulation Index 16.06 9.28 4 32 22.39 8.43 11 32 8.62 1.25 4 10
Log Change in Employment in All Sectors .015 .020 -.048 .078 .015 .020 -.039 .078 .015 .021 -.048 .062
Log Change in Employment in Manufacturing -.029 .043 -.365 .112 -.033 .044 -.365 .082 -.025 .041 -.170 .112
Log Change in Employment in Real Estate .009 .070 -.342 .244 .011 .066 -.290 .244 .007 .074 -.342 .192
Log Change in Average Wage in All Sectors .016 .021 -.058 .107 .017 .023 -.058 .089 .015 .018 -.045 .107
Log Change in Personal Income per Capita .023 .019 -.035 .097 .024 .019 -.019 .082 .022 .020 -.035 .097
Log Change in Total Consumption per Capita .026 .013 -.003 .089 .027 .012 .000 .059 .024 .014 -.003 .089
Log Change in House Price Index .068 .050 -.108 .253 .075 .057 -.108 .253 .060 .038 -.062 .218
Unemployment Rate .049 .010 .023 .081 .049 .010 .023 .069 .049 .011 .025 .081
Notes: This table reports means (population weighted), standard deviations, minimum and maximum values of
the main variables used in the present study. The sample includes 48 states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and
17 years from 1991 to 2007. States that deregulated their banking sector before (after) 1985 are classified as
early (late) deregulation states. The change in import exposure per worker and the instrument are calculated
using equations (23) and (24) in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the first year of
deregulation. Data on employment and wages are from the CBP. Data on personal income and consumption are
from the BEA. Data on house price indexes are from the FHFA. Data on unemployment rate are from the BLS.
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Table 2: House prices, import exposure and banking deregulation (state-level results)
Dependent Variable: House Price Index (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IE -2.1445*** -3.1155*** -2.4646*** -2.9590***
(0.5642) (0.6378) (0.7346) (0.7958)
∆IE × DI 0.0561*** 0.0377*** 0.0815*** 0.0682***
(0.0110) (0.0128) (0.0218) (0.0217)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.23
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 48
states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a
logarithmic change in house price index. The change in import exposure per worker is calculated
using equation (24) in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the first
year of deregulation. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted by state
share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 3: Consumption growth, import exposure and banking deregulation (state-level results)
Dependent Variable: Consumption per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IE -0.2622** -0.3319*** -0.2469* -0.3107**
(0.1106) (0.1233) (0.1235) (0.1494)
∆IE × DI 0.0116*** 0.0108*** 0.0087* 0.0076*
(0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0043) (0.0044)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 48
states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and 11 years from 1997 to 2007. Dependent variable is a
logarithmic change in total consumption per capita. The change in import exposure per worker
is calculated using equation (24) in themain text. Deregulation index equals number of years since
the first year of deregulation. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted
by state share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by state. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
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Table 4: Wage growth, import exposure and banking deregulation (state-level results)
Dependent Variable: Average Wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IE -0.2555** -0.2180 -0.3968** -0.3791
(0.1169) (0.1408) (0.1569) (0.2264)
∆IE × DI 0.0170*** 0.0141*** 0.0189* 0.0149**
(0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0103) (0.0065)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.57
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 48
states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a
logarithmic change in average wage. The change in import exposure per worker is calculated
using equation (24) in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the first
year of deregulation. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted by state
share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 5: Personal income growth, import exposure and banking deregulation (state-level results)
Dependent Variable: Personal Income per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IE -0.5115*** -0.5222*** -0.6351*** -0.5772***
(0.1394) (0.1406) (0.1857) (0.2081)
∆IE × DI 0.0192*** 0.0173*** 0.0265** 0.0243***
(0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0103) (0.0074)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.58
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 48
states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a
logarithmic change in personal income per capita. The change in import exposure per worker is
calculated using equation (24) in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since
the first year of deregulation. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted
by state share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by state. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
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Table 6: Sectoral employment, import exposure and banking deregulation (state-level results)
Dependent Variable: Employment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. All Sectors
∆IE -0.3760*** -0.5254*** -0.4575** -0.6230***
(0.1339) (0.1360) (0.1905) (0.2287)
∆IE × DI 0.0083* 0.0033 0.0119 0.0075
(0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0104) (0.0084)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73
Panel B. Manufacturing
∆IE -0.8006*** -0.6669*** -1.1026*** -1.0917***
(0.2070) (0.2387) (0.3466) (0.3911)
∆IE × DI -0.0010 -0.0007 0.0148 0.0162
(0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0139) (0.0147)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72
Panel C. Real Estate
∆IE -1.4000** -1.5421** -1.9523** -2.3714**
(0.5605) (0.7432) (0.8278) (1.0351)
∆IE × DI 0.0307*** 0.0332** 0.0539** 0.0404*
(0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0255) (0.0214)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 48
states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a
logarithmic change in number of employees in all sectors (Panel A), the manufacturing sector
(Panel B), and the real estate sector (Panel C). The change in import exposure per worker is cal-
culated using equation (24) in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the
first year of deregulation. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted by
state share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
state. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
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Table 7: Unemployment, import exposure and banking deregulation (state-level results)
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IE 0.1152*** 0.1182*** 0.2155*** 0.2099***
(0.0382) (0.0423) (0.0589) (0.0588)
∆IE × DI -0.0024*** -0.0026* -0.0083*** -0.0077***
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0021)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 48
states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a
change in unemployment rate. The change in import exposure per worker is calculated using
equation (24) in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the first year of
deregulation. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted by state share of
national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. *,**,***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 8: House prices, import exposure and banking deregulation (commuting zone-level results)
Dependent Variable: House Price Index (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IE -1.1466*** -1.7355*** -0.8528*** -1.4086***
(0.1789) (0.2563) (0.1938) (0.3369)
∆IE × DI 0.0509*** 0.0249*** 0.0318** 0.0074
(0.0141) (0.0074) (0.0150) (0.0068)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.41 0.47 0.48
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 722
commuting zones and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a logarithmic change
in house price index. The change in import exposure per worker is calculated using equation (24)
in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the first year of deregulation.
All regressions include commuting zone and year fixed effects and are weighted by commuting
zone share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by commuting zone. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
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Table 9: Wage growth, import exposure and banking deregulation (commuting zone-level results)
Dependent Variable: Average Wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IE -0.1641*** -0.1551 -0.1899*** -0.1720
(0.0404) (0.1087) (0.0716) (0.1747)
∆IE × DI 0.0091*** 0.0072*** 0.0103* 0.0078**
(0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0055) (0.0032)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 722
commuting zones and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a logarithmic change
in average wage. The change in import exposure per worker is calculated using equation (24) in
the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the first year of deregulation.
All regressions include commuting zone and year fixed effects and are weighted by commuting
zone share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by commuting zone. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 10: Personal income growth, import exposure and banking deregulation (commuting zone-
level results)
Dependent Variable: Personal Income per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IE -0.2827*** -0.3633*** -0.3040*** -0.3885***
(0.0515) (0.0813) (0.0695) (0.1160)
∆IE × DI 0.0117*** 0.0093*** 0.0127*** 0.0097***
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0043) (0.0030)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 722
commuting zones and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a logarithmic change
in personal income per capita. The change in import exposure per worker is calculated using
equation (24) in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the first year of
deregulation. All regressions include commuting zone and year fixed effects and are weighted by
commuting zone share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by commuting zone. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level
respectively.
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Table 11: Sectoral employment, import exposure and banking deregulation (commuting zone-
level results)
Dependent Variable: Employment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. All Sectors
∆IE -0.1916*** -0.2728*** -0.1935* -0.2950*
(0.0550) (0.0783) (0.1004) (0.1530)
∆IE × DI 0.0060** 0.0024 0.0067 0.0039
(0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0055) (0.0039)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38
Panel B. Manufacturing
∆IE -0.5600*** -0.3866** -0.7770*** -0.7158***
(0.1016) (0.1629) (0.1734) (0.2717)
∆IE × DI -0.0007 0.0031 0.0126 0.0169*
(0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0092) (0.0089)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.30
Panel C. Real Estate
∆IE -0.5590*** -0.7945*** -0.7227** -1.0496**
(0.1932) (0.2936) (0.3065) (0.4389)
∆IE × DI 0.0186* 0.0175 0.0281* 0.0187
(0.0096) (0.0127) (0.0167) (0.0170)
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-1991× ∆IE No Yes No Yes
Aggregate× DI No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the regression model (25). The sample includes 722
commuting zones and 17 years from 1991 to 2007. Dependent variable is a logarithmic change
in number of employees in all sectors (Panel A), the manufacturing sector (Panel B), and the real
estate sector (Panel C). The change in import exposure perworker is calculated using equation (24)
in the main text. Deregulation index equals number of years since the first year of deregulation.
All regressions include commuting zone and year fixed effects and are weighted by commuting
zone share of national population in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by commuting zone. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
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Table 12: Bank-County lending responses of commercial banks to the China shock
Dependent variable: LRb,ct
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Diversification measure
























(0.052) (0.069) (0.242) (0.001)
DIV
b
t−1 −0.166∗∗∗ −0.102 −0.729∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.151) (0.214) (0.001)
Observations 409,038 405,381 405,381 405,381 383,686
R
2
0.202 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.202
Notes: The table reports bank-county level regressions of the form LRb,ct = α × ∆IEct + δ × ∆IEct ×
DIVbt−1 + CONTROLS for different measures of bank-level diversification as indicated in the headings of
columns (2)-(5) and for a sample of commercial banks over the period 1995-2007. The vector of controls
contains bank-county and state-year fixed effects and (except in column (1)) the stand-alone term DIVbt−1.
To make the coefficient α comparable across specifications (1) and (2)-(5) as the county-level average effect,
DIVbt−1 is cross-sectionally demeaned. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level and
1,2,3 asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 13: Lending responses to the China shock in a placebo sample of mortgage companies
Dependent variable: LRb,ct






















t−1 −0.103∗∗ −0.005 −0.187
(0.043) (0.064) (0.240)
Observations 958,809 957,029 957,029 957,029
R
2
0.632 0.632 0.632 0.632
Notes: The table reports institution-county level regressions of form LRb,ct = α × ∆IEct + δ × ∆IEct ×
DIVbt−1 + CONTROLS for different measures of bank-level diversification as indicated in the headings of
columns (2)-(4) and for a sample of mortgage companies over the period 1995-2007. The vector of controls
contains bank-county and state-year fixed effects and (except in column (1)) the stand-alone term DIVbt−1.
To make the coefficient α comparable across specifications (1) and (2)-(4) as the county-level average effect,
DIVbt−1 is cross-sectionally demeaned. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level and
1,2,3 asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 14: County level instrumental variable regression for house prices
(1) (2)

















population growth lagged −1.443∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.623) (0.099)






F-stat on excluded instruments 27.2
(p-val: 0)
Notes: The table reports the first and second stages of the county-level IV regression for house price growth,
(32)
∆hpict = a× LRct + b× ∆IE
CZ(c)
t + CONTROLS
with LRct instrumented by the granular lending response GLRct . The granular lending response is con-






t−1 given by the de iure market shares
(38) and with DIVbt−1 and π
b,c
t−1 calculated based on the de iure portfolio shares (39). The sample comprises
counties in the 722 commuter zones over the period 1995-2007. The vector of controls contains year fixed
effects and and interaction of state-fixed effects with the granular term Gct−1 in equation (35). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuter zone level and 1,2,3 asterisks denote significance at




In our empirical analysiswe use the following control variables provided byHoffmann and Stewen
(2020).
Indicators of monetary policy and credit availability: The short-term real interest rate is con-
structed as U.S. (effective) Federal Funds minus U.S.-wide inflation. Data on Federal Funds are
from the Board ofGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, Historical Data. U.S. inflation is com-
puted using data on Personal Consumption Expenditures from the BEA. Themeasure ofmonetary
policy looseness is constructed as the deviation of the monetary policy rate from the interest rate
implied by a Taylor rule. The monetary policy rate is the U.S. (effective) Federal Funds rate from
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Taylor rule used is: 0.02 + 1.5 (p -
0.02) + 0.5 · output gap, where p is U.S.- wide inflation and the output gap is measured by de-
trending an index for real GDP (constructed using the cumulation of official quarterly real GDP
growth rates) with the HP-filter. Real long-term interest rates are measured as the 10-year constant
maturity Treasury bond rate minus expectations of the average annual rate of CPI inflation over
the next 10 years from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (only available from 1992), in per-
cent per annum. Finally, we use two measures from surveys on credit credit conditions. The first
is Net Percentage of Domestic Banks Reporting Increased Willingness to Make Consumer Installment
Loans from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis. A positive value for this variable therefore indicates a loosening of credit conditions.
The second measure, “Good time to buy”, the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers that
reflects consumers’ opinion towards the house buying conditions. Financial Distress is measured
as Corporate Bond Yield Spread between AAA- and BAA-rated corporate bonds.
Pre-91 state-level characteristics: GDP of tradable sector is measured by manufacturing sector
GDP at state level from the BEA regional accounts. GDP of non-tradable sector is measured by
retail trade sector GDP at state level from the BEA regional accounts. Tradable residential wages
are measured by private non-farm wages and salaries in manufacturing sector and are from the
BEA regional accounts. Non-tradable residential wages are measured by private non-farm wages
and salaries in retail trade sector and are from the BEA regional accounts. Total employment is total
full-time and part-time employment from the BEA regional accounts. Exports to GDP ratio at the
state-level is calculated using the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) data on interstate shipments
among the 48 contiguous US states.
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